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NOTE
EDWARDSAQUIFER AUTHORITY V. DAYAND THE
SEARCH FOR CONSISTENCY IN THE THEORY OF
GROUNDWATER RIGHTS
Adam T. Waltont
I. INTRODUCTION
For millennia, men have fought over groundwater rights. Even the
Hebrew Patriarchs, Abraham and Isaac, were embroiled in disputes with
their Philistine neighbors over whether they held exclusive possessory rights
over the wells that they dug.' In contemporary society, groundwater rights
remain an extraordinarily slippery issue. And the ever-increasing demands
of modern urban development only serve to accentuate the problems in this
area.
Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day2 represents the most recent effort of
the Texas Supreme Court to address the tensions regarding groundwater
rights.3 As this Note will demonstrate, the Day case provides a framework
within which to explore the underlying theory of groundwater rights as it
relates to the problems of modern society. Texas's approach to water law is
important because Texas has appropriated legal principles from many other
jurisdictions, integrated them with concepts from other areas of law, and
applied them to groundwater in a unique manner. Additionally, due to the
topographical, geological, meteorological, and climatological diversity of
the Lone Star State, disputes over groundwater rights recur frequently and
t Notes and Comments Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAw REviEw, Volume 8. J.D.
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1. See Genesis 21:23-32; 26:12-33.
2. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
3. Prior to Day, discussions of groundwater rights in Texas jurisprudence were largely
controlled by Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904). See, e.g.,
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). Of course, it
remains to be seen how the Day decision will affect the development of Texas jurisprudence
in the future. This will largely depend on how the courts approach the task of harmonizing
Day with East. This Note seeks to address that task.
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command a significant amount of attention from the state legislature,
administrative agencies, and courts. Thus, Texas is making key
contributions to the development of groundwater rights.
The Day case raises critical issues regarding the underlying theory of
groundwater rights. This Note will explore two principles affirmed and
developed in the Day decision. First, the Day court applies the concept of
ownership in place' to groundwater rights.' For decades, numerous states
have recognized ownership in place as a guiding principle of mineral, coal,
and oil and gas law; however, until now, this principle has never been
applied to groundwater-an application unique to Texas jurisprudence.
Second, the Day court reaffirms the rule of capture6 in its strict English
form.7 This too sets Texas water law apart from other jurisdictions. Over the
past hundred years, most American jurisdictions have moved away from
the rule of capture in favor of an alternative scheme such as the "reasonable
use" rule or correlative rights doctrine." Texas's consistent affirmation of the
rule of capture helps to balance proprietary rights against the vicissitudes
and demands of usage.
As this Note will demonstrate, these principles are not mere pedantic
theories.' Rather, they have a vital impact on the practical rights of private
4. The "ownership-in-place theory" refers to
[a] characterization of oil-and-gas rights used in a majority of
jurisdictions, holding that the owner has the right to present possession
of the oil and gas in place as well as the right to use the land surface to
search, develop, and produce from the property, but that the interest in
the minerals terminates if the oil and gas flows out from under the
owner's land. This theory is used in Texas, New Mexico, Kansas,
Mississippi, and other major producing states.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1215-16 (9th ed. 2009).
5. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
6. In the context of water law, the "rule of capture" refers to "[tihe principle that a
surface landowner can extract and appropriate all the groundwater beneath the land by
drilling or pumping, even if doing so drains away groundwaters to the point of drying up
springs and wells from which other landowners benefit." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1448 (9th
ed. 2009). In the context of oil and gas law, the courts have generally articulated the same
principle, "holding that there is no liability for drainage of oil and gas from under the lands
of another so long as there has been no trespass and all relevant statutes and regulations have
been observed." Id.
7. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
8. See 6 JAMEs B. WADLEY, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 50.11(a), (e)-(g) (David A.
Thomas ed., 2d Thomas ed. 2003).
9. See discussion infra Part II.A.
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landowners and the management responsibilities of administrative
agencies. The challenges presented by the physical characteristics and
location of the Edwards Aquifer are unique and complex and so are the
regulatory schemes enacted to address them. This Note will illustrate the
interplay between the concept of ownership in place and the rule of capture
by exploring how these principles affect this unique situation." Also, this
Note will suggest ways in which the Day decision may affect future
interpretations, applications, and modifications of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority Act."
Finally, this Note will make a two-part proposal for integrating and
clarifying Texas's approach to the theory of groundwater rights. First, the
Note will clarify the proper definitions of the concept of ownership in place
and the rule of capture. Second, the Note will discuss how the
harmonization of these principles should affect the ways in which
groundwater resources are regulated in the future. If the Texas Supreme
Court builds on Day by integrating the rule of capture with the concept of
ownership in place, then Day will represent a valuable contribution to the
modern understanding of groundwater rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Factual Context of Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day
Before considering the legal framework that undergirds the Day decision,
it is important to establish the factual context of the case. The regulatory
battles that occurred between the Edwards Aquifer Authority and the
private landowners bringing suit illustrate both the theoretical and practical
importance of the concept of ownership in place and the rule of capture.
1. The Claims of the Private Landowners
The theory of groundwater rights cannot be developed and perfected in a
vacuum. As with every other legal concept, the significance of the concept
of ownership in place and the rule of capture is most keenly apparent when
these principles are applied to the lives of common individuals in the
community. The Day court would never have reassessed the theory of
groundwater rights if they had not been presented with a conflict between
10. See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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the Edwards Aquifer Authority and two private landowners in Atascosa
County.12
a. General factual setting of the case
(1) Dependence on the Edwards Aquifer
The Edwards Aquifer is the primary source of water for much of south
central Texas." Notably, this aquifer is "one of the largest and most
important karst aquifer systems in the United States."" As described by the
Edwards Aquifer Authority Hydrologic Data Report for 2010:
The aquifer extends through parts of Kinney, Uvalde, Zavala,
Medina, Frio, Atascosa, Bexar, Comal, Guadalupe, and Hays
counties and covers an area approximately 180 miles long and
five to 40 miles wide. The aquifer is the primary water source for
much of this area, including the City of San Antonio and
surrounding communities. Historically[,] the cities of Uvalde,
San Antonio, New Braunfels, and San Marcos were founded
around large springs that discharge from the aquifer. As the
region grew, wells were drilled into the aquifer to supplement
water supplied by the springs. In addition, the Edwards Aquifer
is the principal source of water for agriculture and industry in
the region and provides springflow required for endangered
species habitat, as well as recreational purposes and downstream
uses in Nueces, San Antonio, and Guadalupe river basins."
The combined land area of the drainage zone, recharge zone, and artesian
zone of the aquifer is approximately 8,000 square miles.'6 This area
encompasses nineteen counties and is home to at least 1.7 million
inhabitants." Moreover, over the past seventy years, the records and trends
12. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012).
13. EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTH., EDWARDs AQUIFER AUTHORITY HYDROLOGIC DATA
REPORT FOR 2010, at 5 (Report No. 11-01 December 2010), http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/
documents/201 1Hamilton-etal_2010HydrologicData.pdf.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ronald Kaiser, Groundwater Management in Texas: Evolution or Intelligent Design?,
15-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467, 482 (2006).
17. Id.; EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTH., supra note 13, at 15 (showing the aquifer's various
zones as they extend through the counties of Edwards, Real, Kerr, Bandera, Gillespie, Blanco,
Hays, Caldwell, Kendall, Comal, Guadalupe, Bexar, Wilson, Kinney, Uvalde, Medina, Zavala,
Frio, and Atascosa). Obviously, the largest city in this geographical area is San Antonio. For
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indicate that the water usage in this area has increased over 500%.'" Now
more than ever, the Edwards Aquifer is vital to the life of south central
Texas.
(2) Physical characteristics of the Edwards Aquifer
In light of the area's dependence on the Edwards Aquifer and the
increasing usage levels, the physical characteristics of the Edwards Aquifer
and its recharge zone are particularly significant-and problematic. As
summarized by the Edwards Aquifer Authority,
[t]he Edwards Aquifer is a karst aquifer, characterized by the
presence of sinkholes, sinking streams, caves, large springs, and a
well-integrated subsurface drainage system.... The aquifer
exhibits extremely high (cavernous) porosity and permeability,
characteristic of many karst aquifers. In contrast, aquifers that
occur in sand and gravel or in many other rock types, such as
sandstone, have a much lower permeability. Because the Edwards
Aquifer is known for having areas of high permeability, it allows
the transmission of large volumes of water, enabling
groundwater levels to respond quickly to rainfall (recharge)
events.19
The extreme porosity and permeability of the aquifer result in equally
extreme volatility in the water levels of the aquifer.20 Thus, although the
aquifer responds quickly to adequate rainfall, it is especially vulnerable in
times of drought and is peculiarly susceptible to the effects of over-
pumping.2' These vulnerabilities and susceptibilities highlight the need for
careful regulation and management of groundwater resources.
more information regarding the population and demographics of San Antonio and the
surrounding areas that depend on the Edwards Aquifer, see www.census.gov.
18. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 4:36 (Law of Water Rights
and Resources Database, updated July 2012) (stating that "[w]ater use... increased over
500% from 1940 to 1990").
19. EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTH., supra note 13, at 5-6.
20. PETER G. GEORGE, ROBERT E. MACE & RIMA PETROSSIAN, AQUIFERS OF TEXAS REPORT
380, at 27 (Susann Doenges ed., Texas Water Development Board July 2011),
https://www.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/numbered-reports/doc/R380-Aquifersof
Texas.pdf.
21. Id.
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b. Specific parties and issues in the case
(1) State of the land under prior ownership
The specific parcel of land involved in the dispute in Day consists of
381.40 acres in Atascosa County, which lies directly south of Bexar County
and the City of San Antonio.22 The only land in Atascosa County that is fed
by the Edwards Aquifer lies at the northernmost tip of the county.23 On the
parcel involved in the Day case, the earliest notable water development
occurred in 1956 when the then-owners drilled a well." Through the 1970s,
the water from the well was used for irrigation and agricultural purposes. 25
In 1983, the casing of the well shaft collapsed, and the owners discontinued
its active use.26 Nevertheless, the well continued to produce water through
artesian pressure.27 This water flowed through a natural ditch into a fifty-
acre lake, which was used for both recreational and agricultural purposes.28
During the 1980s, Billy and Bret Mitchell owned the land.29 The Mitchells
used the land to raise Costal Bermuda Grass (a common hay-crop).30 In
1983-1984, during a drought, they irrigated their crop with water from the
well-fed lake.3' In the early 1990s, however, the Mitchells abandoned their
22. Id. Notably, the vast majority of Atascosa County is covered by the Carrizo-Wilcox
Aquifer. Compare id. at 23 (showing the coverage of the Carrizo-Wilcox Aquifer), with id. at
27 (showing the coverage of the Edwards Aquifer). Differing significantly from the Edwards
Aquifer, the Carrizo-Wilcox is an enormous sandy aquifer stretching from the Texas-
Louisiana border to the Texas-Mexico border and covering sixty-six counties over the span
of 25,409 square miles. Id. at 23-25. It is ironic that the most recent landmark case defining
the extent of groundwater rights (the Day case) grew out of a dispute over one of the most
unique aquifers in Texas (the Edwards Aquifer) in an area that is barely covered by that
aquifer (Atascosa County). Undoubtedly, those who disagree with the conclusions of the Day
court will cite the old adage that bad facts make bad law. More importantly, however,
difficult facts force lawyers, judges, and politicians to think more critically and consistently
as to the principles they are seeking to develop and apply. Thus, in actuality, the facts of the
Day case presented the perfect opportunity for reconsidering the theory of groundwater
rights.
23. See id. at 27.
24. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. 2012).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 820-21.
30. Id. at 820.
31. Id.
32 [Vol. 8:27
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agricultural water usage and used the groundwater and lake water
exclusively for domestic and recreational purposes. 32
(2) State of the land under current ownership
In 1994, the plaintiffs in the present case, R. Burrell Day and Joel
McDaniel, purchased the property from the Mitchells.33 This transfer took
place one year after the Edwards Aquifer Authority assumed responsibility
for regulating use of the Edwards Aquifer." Day and McDaniel intended to
use the land for the purpose of growing oats and peanuts and grazing
cattle." In accordance with the newly introduced regulatory scheme, 6 Day
applied for a permit to reopen the 1956 well for active pumping.37 The
application requested the use of 600 acre-feet of water per annum for
irrigation of 300 acres of crops and 100 acre-feet of water per annum for
sustaining the level of the fifty-acre lake." While waiting on a response from
the Edwards Aquifer Authority, Day replaced the 1965 well "at a cost of
$95,000" and amended his application accordingly." It was during this
application process that a conflict arose as to Day's ownership and usage
rights in the groundwater beneath his property.40
2. The Claims of the Edwards Aquifer Authority
In order to understand the legal battle that erupted between Day and the
Edwards Aquifer Authority, it is necessary to gain a basic familiarity with
the general structure of the Edwards Aquifer Authority and the specific
regulatory provisions that occasioned the conflict. Although an
investigation of the complexity and sophistication of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority Act is beyond the scope of this work, a general knowledge of the
Act provides the necessary context within which to consider the underlying
theory of groundwater rights.
32. Id. at 820-21.
33. Id. at 818.
34. Id.
35. Id. Rather than referring to both Day and McDaniel throughout the opinion, the
Day court referred to the parties collectively as "Day." Id. In the interest of clarity and
efficiency, the author will do the same here.
36. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
37. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 820.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 820-21.
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a. The purpose and policy of the Edwards Aquifer Authority
The Edwards Aquifer Authority was formed in 1993, in recognition of
the fact that "[t]he Edwards Aquifer is 'the primary source of water for
south central Texas and therefore vital to the residents, industry, and
ecology of the region, the State's economy, and the public welfare."'42 The
Texas Legislature has specifically articulated the rationale behind the
Authority:
The legislature finds that the Edwards Aquifer is a unique and
complex hydrological system, with diverse economic and social
interest dependent on the aquifer for water supply.... To sustain
these diverse interests and that natural resource, a special
regional management district is required for the effective control
of the resource to protect terrestrial and aquatic life, domestic
and municipal water supplies, the operation of existing
industries, and the economic development of the state. Use of
water in the district for beneficial purposes requires that all
reasonable measures be taken to be conservative in water use.43
To make the purpose of the Authority perfectly clear, the legislature stated:
it is necessary, appropriate, and a benefit to the welfare of this
state to provide for the management of the aquifer through the
application of management mechanisms consistent with our
41. The Edwards Aquifer Authority is specially created and defined by the Edwards
Aquifer Authority Act (EAAA). Act of May 30, 1993, 73d Leg., F.S., ch. 626, 1993 Tex. Gen.
Laws 2350, amended by Act of May 16, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 524, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws
3280; Act of May 29, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 261, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2505; Act of May 6,
1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 163, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 634; Act of May 25, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 1192, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2696; Act of May 28, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 966, §§ 2.60-62
and 6.01-.05, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 1991, 2021-2022, 2075-2076; Act of May 25, 2001, 77th
Leg., R.S., ch. 1192, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2696; Act of June 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 1112,
§ 6.01(4), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 3188, 3193; Act of May 23, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 510, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 900; Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1351, §§ 2.01-2.12, 2007 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4612, 4627-4634; Act of May 28, 2007, 80th Leg., R.S., ch. 1430, §§ 12.01-12.12,
2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 5848, 5901-5909; Act of May 21, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., ch. 1080, 2009
Tex. Gen. Laws 2818 [hereinafter "EAAA"]. Citations are to the EAAA's current sections,
without separate references to amending enactments. The EAAA remains uncodified, but an
unofficial compilation can be found on the Authority's website, available at
http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/filed/EAAact.pdf.
42. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 818.
43. EAAA § 1.01.
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legal system and appropriate to the aquifer system.... The
authority is created to serve a public use and benefit."
In other words, the regulatory functions and powers of the Authority are
designed and intended to further the public interests of the state.45 At the
same time, these interests cannot be interpreted or construed in a manner
that is inconsistent with the groundwater rights of individual property
owners. Once again, the legislature was very clear:
[A]ction taken pursuant to this Act may not be construed as
depriving or divesting the owner ... of these ownership rights or
as impairing the contract rights of any person who purchases
water for the provision of potable water to the public or for the
resale of potable water to the public for any use .... The
legislature intends that just compensation be paid if
implementation of this article causes a taking of private property
or the impairment of a contract in contravention of the Texas or
federal constitution.'
Essentially then, the legislature created the Edwards Aquifer Authority in an
attempt to balance the established property interests and groundwater
rights of individual citizens against the unique physical characteristics of the
Edwards Aquifer and the complex socio-geopolitical demands of the
dependent area. Thus, the form and function of the Authority embody an
explicit policy restraint. Properly administered, the Authority can
accommodate the needs of the public while simultaneously protecting the
rights of the landowners.
b. The basic functions of the Edwards Aquifer Authority
In order to accomplish its stated purpose, the Edwards Aquifer Authority
is endowed with "all of the powers, rights, and privileges necessary to
manage, conserve, preserve, and protect the aquifer and to increase the
recharge of, and prevent the waste or pollution of water in, the aquifer.""
These powers, rights, and privileges are primarily exercised by means of the
issuance and enforcement of permits for water usage and withdrawal.
Before granting any permit for the withdrawal of water from the aquifer, the
Authority must be satisfied that the water quality of the aquifer and surface
44. Id. 1.06.
45. Id.
46. Id. 5 1.07.
47. Id. § 1.08(a).
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streams fed by the aquifer is protected, that the maximum water
conservation is achieved, that the most beneficial use of water is facilitated,
that "the hydro-geologic connection and interaction between surface water
and groundwater" is properly accommodated, that aquatic and wildlife
habitat is maintained, that threatened and endangered species are protected,
and that instream uses, bays, and estuaries are guarded." Unless all of these
interests are recognized and respected, the Authority cannot grant a
withdrawal permit. 9 Moreover, since the beginning of 2008, the Authority
has limited the amount of permitted withdrawals to "572,000 acre-feet of
water for each calendar year." 0
c. The types of permits issued by the Edwards Aquifer Authority
Generally speaking, the Authority may issue four types of permits. First,
the Authority may issue an interim authorization to property owners who
control a producing well so long as the well meets statutory and regulatory
standards, the water is not wasted, and a declaration of historical use was
filed before March 1, 1994." An interim authorization allows only
withdrawal of the amount of water proven in the declaration of historical
use.5 2 It terminates when the Authority issues a final response to the
property owner's application for a regular permit."
Second, the Authority may issue a regular permit to existing users that
are able to satisfy the withdrawal requirements mentioned above." The
most important aspect of these permits is that they are issued in order of
submission, with absolute preference being given to those who submitted
their application "on or before the initial application date of March 1,
1994."ss The other substantial limits on obtaining this type of permit are the
historical and beneficial use requirements that are discussed below.5 6
Third, the Authority may issue term permits, which are valid up to ten
years, to applicants whose usage request satisfies the feasibility analysis of
48. Id. § 1.14(a)(1)-(8).
49. Id. § 1.14(a).
50. Id. § 1.14(c).
51. Id. § 1.17(a).
52. Id. § 1.17(b).
53. Id. § 1.17(d)(1).
54. Id. § 1.18(a)-(b).
55. Id. § 1.18(b).
56. See infra Part II.A.2.d-e.
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the Authority." These permits allow the Authority an essential degree of
managerial flexibility within the terms established by "the authority's
critical period management plan."" Generally, term permits are limited in
accordance with the water levels of the various sections of the aquifer and
the flow rates of springs in the area." Also, these permits are interruptible
and terminable at the discretion of the Authority.60
Last, the Authority may issue emergency permits in drastic situations
where immediate access to water is necessary "to prevent the loss of life or
to prevent severe, imminent threats to the public health or safety."61 Such
permits are absolutely limited to 30-day periods, but they are renewable. 62
Given the nature of such a permit, its holder "may withdraw water from the
aquifer without regard to its effect on other permit holders." 6
d. Historical use requirements for withdrawal permits
Perhaps the Authority's most significant consideration in analyzing
withdrawals from the Edwards Aquifer relates to the historical use
requirements. As the Day court explains, "[tihe Act gives preference to
'existing users'-defined as persons who 'withdrew and beneficially used
underground water from the aquifer on or before June 1, 1993'-and their
successors and principals. With few exceptions, water may not be
withdrawn from the aquifer through wells drilled after June 1, 1993."16' The
historical period established by the Act is "from June 1, 1972, through May
31, 1993."65 When an existing user applies for a regular permit, he must
establish "by convincing evidence" that he utilized groundwater in a
beneficial manner during the historical period.66 The Authority does not
consider any use made of the groundwater before or after the designated
historical period.67 If a property owner is able to demonstrate the amount of
land "actually irrigated in any one calendar year during the historical
57. EAAA § 1.19(a).
58. Id. § 1.19(b).
59. Id. § 1.19(b)(1)-(3), (c).
60. Id. § 1.19(a).
61. Id. § 1.20(a).
62. Id. § 1.20(b)-(c).
63. Id. § 1.20(d).
64. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Tex. 2012).
65. EAAA § 1.16(a).
66. Id. § 1.16(a), (d)-(e).
67. Id. § 1.16(a), (e).
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period," he will be permitted to pump "not less than two acre-feet" per
annum per acre.6 ' Given the difficulty of proving historical use, the
Authority may allow applicants to substitute average or normal usage
amounts when actual usage amounts are unavailable."
e. Beneficial use requirements and waste restrictions
As noted previously, the Edwards Aquifer Authority will not grant
withdrawal permits without first balancing the diverse interests that depend
on the preservation and conservation of the aquifer.70 Thus, the terms of a
permit will be determined by "the beneficial use of water without waste."'
The term beneficial use is defined by the legislature as "the use of the
amount of water that is economically necessary for a purpose authorized by
law, when reasonable intelligence and reasonable diligence are used in
applying the water to that purpose."72 In order to substantiate the idea of
beneficial use, the legislature went on to define several types of uses that
could fall into the category of beneficial use.73 These types of uses include
conservation, domestic or livestock use, industrial use, irrigation use,
municipal use, or agricultural use.
Moreover, the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act provides a detailed
definition of waste that includes references to the rate and amount of water
withdrawals, the flow and production of wells, the escape of groundwater to
unsuitable reservoirs, the pollution or alteration of groundwater, and the
escape of irrigation tailwater."
68. Id. § 1.16(e).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 1.14(a)(1)-(8). See supra Part II.A.2.b.
71. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 819 (Tex. 2012).
72. EAAA § 1.03(4).
73. See, e.g., id. § 1.03(7), (9), (11), (12), (14), (26).
74. See id. § 1.03(7), (9), (11), (12), (14), (26).
75. Id. § 1.03(21)(A)-(F). Notably, the legislature has provided a distinct definition of
waste as it relates to water produced by an artesian well. Id. § 1.03(21)(G). Hence, since Day's
well produced water, at least in part, by artesian pressure, the Authority's definition of waste
has limited applicability. Moreover, it is interesting to note that EAAA § 1.08(b) states that
"[tihe authority's powers regarding underground water apply only to underground water
within or withdrawn from the aquifer. This subsection is not intended to allow the authority
to regulate surface water." This provision is pregnant with important implications for the
Day case. Consider the following hypothesis:
(1) since the Authority is not allowed to regulate surface water,
(2) since the groundwater collected in Day's lake was held to be surface water,
and
38 [Vol. 8:27
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3. Summary of the Procedural History of the Case
The legal battle between Day and the Edwards Aquifer Authority was
protracted. When Day filed his initial application for a permit in 1996, he
could hardly have imagined that sixteen years later his case would be
remanded from the Texas Supreme Court in conjunction with the
publication of a landmark opinion. Hence, before returning to the
theoretical implications of the Day case, it is important to summarize the
procedural history of the case.
a. History of the case through the administrative process
In December 1997, a full year after receiving Day's application for a
permit, the Edwards Aquifer Authority responded with a preliminary
allowance for 600 acre-feet of water per annum to be used to irrigate the 300
acres that Day intended to utilize for growing crops and grazing cattle.7 1
The Authority granted this preliminary allowance on the basis of the
Mitchells' alleged use of water for irrigation purposes during the historical
period." Two years passed without any change. In December 1999, Day
amended his application to reflect the fact that he had drilled a replacement
well to take the place of the original 1956 well.o Although the Authority was
still not prepared to act on Day's application, Day proceeded to use the new
well in the interim." Finally, in November 2000, the Authority issued a
formal response to Day and rejected his application for a permit. 82 In
support of this decision, the Authority cited the fact that Day had not
(3) since the artesian pressure of Day's well would presumably continue to
pump water into the lake,
(4) then Day can irrigate with water from the lake even if he was precluded
from pumping water from the well.
In reality, the only thing that might limit such usage is the provision against wasting water
from artesian wells; but this seems to be inapplicable to Day's proposed use. See TEXAS
WATER CODE § 11.205 ("Unless the water from an artesian well is used for a purpose and in a
manner in which it may be lawfully used on the owner's land, it is waste and unlawful to
willfully cause or knowingly permit the water to run off the owner's land or to percolate
through the stratum above which the water is found.").
76. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 820 (Tex. 2012).
77. Id. at 820.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 820-21.
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provided sufficient evidence of beneficial water usage during the historical
period." When Day protested, the case was transferred to the State Office of
Administrative Hearings."
In determining the merits of Day's application, the administrative law
judge considered the historical use of the well without any reference to the
water in the lake, since the water in the lake was deemed to be surface water,
not groundwater." In the discovery process that followed, the former
owners of the property revealed that the water used for irrigation during the
historical period was limited to 150 acres and was drawn from the lake, not
from the well." Only seven acres of the property were directly watered from
the well during the historical period." In an attempt to combat this
evidence, Day provided a report from the U.S. Geological Survey
Department demonstrating that 52.1 million gallons of water had been
pumped from the well during 1972-1973."1 The court held that such
evidence was inconclusive for two reasons." First, the mere removal of such
an amount of water from the well during a two-year period did not provide
any indication that the water was put toward a beneficial use during the
same period.9" Much of the water could have simply gone toward filling the
lake for recreational uses. Second, even if it were assumed that the water
had been put toward a beneficial use, Day had not based his original or
amended application on such use.9' He had only cited the Mitchells' water
use during 1983-1984.92 On these grounds, the administrative judge held
that the Authority's regulations would properly limit Day's use of the well
water to fourteen acre-feet per annum, corresponding to the historical
irrigation of seven acres.93 Unsatisfied, Day appealed to the district court.94
83. Id.
84. Id. at 821.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 821 n.23.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 821.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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b. History of the case through the trial and appellate courts
Day filed suit against the Edwards Aquifer Authority in the 218th
District Court of Texas, Atascosa County." In his complaint, Day asserted
that the Edwards Aquifer Authority's refusal to permit him to use his
groundwater constituted a taking of property under the Texas
Constitution.96 Immediately upon seeing this, the Authority responded by
impleading the State of Texas "as a third-party defendant, asserting
indemnification and contribution for Day's taking claim."" Both sides filed
for summary judgment.98 On one issue, the trial court granted summary
judgment for Day, holding that all the water used for irrigation during the
historical period should be considered part of a beneficial use, even if the
water had flowed into the lake first.99 Nevertheless, on the issue of a
constitutional taking, the trial court granted summary judgment for the
Edwards Aquifer Authority.oo Both parties appealed.'o
The San Antonio Court of Appeals viewed the case from the opposite
perspective. 102 The court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for
Day, holding that any water removed from the lake must be classified as
surface water, not groundwater.o' And the court also reversed the trial
court's summary judgment for the Edwards Aquifer Authority, holding that
"'landowners have some ownership rights in the groundwater beneath their
property [that are] entitled to constitutional protection,' and therefore
95. In re Edwards Aquifer Auth., 217 S.W3d 581, 585, 585 n.1 (Tex. App. 2006).
96. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 821; see also TX CONST. art. I, § 17(a). As it will be seen, Day's
takings claim hinges on the theories involved in the concept of ownership in place and the
rule of capture. See infra Part II.B. From a simple logical standpoint, if ownership of
groundwater does not vest until it is extracted, then a limitation on extraction is not a
deprivation of existing ownership rights; it is only a limit on future or potential ownership
rights. Although a full investigation of the theories and criteria involved in Day's takings
claim is beyond the scope of this work, it is essential to realize that such a claim cannot be
addressed without a clear understanding of the ownership principles explained in this work.
Part of the contemporary confusion over property rights-among both laymen and legal
professionals-springs from attempting to identify a violation of property rights before
establishing a careful, critical, and logical understanding of the nature of such rights.
97. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 821.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 814, 821.
103. Id. at 821.
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Day's takings claim should not have been dismissed."" Once again, both
parties appealed.os The Supreme Court of Texas granted the parties'
petitions for certiorari and handed down its decision in February of 2012-
sixteen years after Day filed his original application for a permit.0o
Essentially, the Day decision declares that the Authority was correct in
limiting Day's permit to fourteen acre-feet of water per annum to reflect the
beneficial uses of the historical period."0 ' Nevertheless, the decision also
declares that Day had "a constitutionally protected interest in the
groundwater beneath his property." 8 The court remanded the issue to the
trial court for further investigation of whether the Authority's actions
constituted a constitutional taking in this case. 09
B. The Legal Context of Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day
A critical portion of the court's analysis in Day is focused on two
fundamental property law principles: (1) ownership in place and (2) the rule
of capture. Thus, in order to understand the court's conclusions as to a
landowner's interests in the water beneath the surface of his land,"0 it is
imperative to understand the context and development of these two
principles."'
104. Id. (quoting Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 274 S.W.3d 742, 753-55 (Tex. App. San
Antonio 2008)).
105. Id. at 822.
106. Id. at 814, 820, 822.
107. Id. at 822.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Confusingly, water beneath the surface of the ground may be designated
"groundwater," "subterranean water," or "underground water," depending on the source and
context. In this Note, the author endeavors to use "groundwater" or "subterranean water" as
the default terms to refer to water beneath the surface of the ground; however, in special
contexts or in quotations, the author may employ "underground water" to refer to the same
object.
111. See Day, 369 S.W.3d at 823-32. The third section of the court's opinion (to which
this citation refers) contains the court's analysis of how the concept of ownership in place
applies to groundwater. See id. This analysis assumes the rule of capture as a well-established
and fundamental standard of Texas property law. Id. As this Note develops, it will become
evident that the juxtaposition of these two principles-ownership in place and the rule of
capture-has complex theoretical ramifications for the nature of groundwater rights. See
infra Part III.
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1. Ownership in Place
The Texas Supreme Court's affirmation of ownership of groundwater in
place is one of the most striking aspects of Edwards Aquifer Authority v.
Day.112 This issue was a matter of first impression for the Texas Supreme
Court."' The court's holding stands in contradiction to the modern trend,
which denies any form of ownership in place with respect to
groundwater."' To appreciate the ramifications of the court's holding it is
helpful to consider the historical development and application of ownership
in place. The court makes it clear that its application of this concept to
groundwater does not occur in a jurisprudential vacuum."' In fact, the
court presents ownership of groundwater in place as the logical extension of
a venerable and extensive body of precedent in English common law, early
American common law, and Texas case law."6
a. Introduction and basic definition of ownership in place
It is important to define the concept of ownership in place so that there is
no confusion as to what the Day court means when it declares that "we held
long ago that oil and gas are owned in place, and we find no reason to treat
groundwater differently.""' The Day court summarizes this concept by
quoting Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co.," 8 a case involving the ownership of oil
and gas:
In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute tide in severalty
to the oil and gas in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that
rule of ownership is that it must be considered in connection with the law of
capture and is subject to police regulations. The oil and gas beneath the soil
are considered a part of the realty. Each owner of land owns separately,
distinctly and exclusively all the oil and gas under his land and is accorded
the usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the minerals or
destroy their market value."9
112. See id. at 831-32, 838.
113. Id. at 823.
114. See WADLEY, supra note 8, § 50.11(a).
115. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 823, 829.
116. Id. at 824, 829-32.
117. Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
118. Elliffv. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948).
119. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 831-32 (quoting Ellif, 201 S.W.2d at 561). Incidentally, the"only qualification" attached to the rule of ownership (i.e., "the law of capture" and "police
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The Day court concludes that "this correctly states the common law
regarding the ownership of groundwater in place." 20
b. Development of ownership in place in other jurisdictions
(1) Development of ownership in place in English
common law
The idea that groundwater can be owned in place is traceable to basic
property law concepts expressed in English case law.'21 In Acton v.
Blundell,12 2 for example, the court declared that groundwater could not be
governed by the same riparian and usufructuary rights'23 that govern
surface water.124 The court asserted three distinct reasons why groundwater
should be treated differently: (1) the law governing surface water springs
from different circumstances and is affected by different considerations
than those related to groundwater;' 25 (2) the application of the same law
would result in disparate and unjust consequences;' 6 and (3) the weight of
precedent and historical authority recognizes substantial differences
between surface water and groundwater.127 For these reasons, the court
concluded that the case should be decided upon
that principle, which gives to the owner of the soil all that lies
beneath his surface; that the land immediately below is his
property, whether it is solid rock, or porous ground, or venous
earth, or part soil, part water; that the person who owns the
regulations") presents substantial difficulties and tensions that will be addressed later on in
this work. See infra Part III.
120. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 832.
121. WADLEY, supra note 8, § 50.11(e).
122. Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223.
123. A "riparian right" is "[tihe right of a landowner whose property borders on a body
of water or watercourse. Such a landowner traditionally has the right to make reasonable use
of the water." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (9th ed. 2009). A "usufructuary right" or
"usufruct" is "[a] right for a certain period to use and enjoy the fruits of another's property
without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing for any natural deterioration in the
property over time." Id. at 1684-85.
124. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233.
125. Id. at 1233-34.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1233-35. Interestingly, the English Court cites a case from the Roman Digest
to support its argument. Id. at 1235. To most modern attorneys, the Latin quotations are
meaningless; however, they reinforce the antiquity of the venerable rule of law espoused by
the Court. See id.
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surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his
own purposes at his free will and pleasure ... .128
Although the court did not specifically designate this principle as
"ownership in place," the principle encapsulates the essence of ownership in
place by affirming an owner's distinct property interest in groundwater.
(2) Development of ownership in place in American
jurisdictions
The rudimentary principles of ownership in place began to develop in
the United States during the nineteenth-century-long before underground
minerals, oil and gas, and groundwater rose to their current value.' 29
Massachusetts case law provides two illustrative cases: Greenleaf v.
Francis'30 and Wilson v. City of New Bedford."' As early as 1836, in
Greenleaf, the Massachusetts court rooted its decision in the basic common
law doctrine that a property owner's rights extend to the sky above and the
earth beneath the surface of his land.'32 Applying this doctrine to a dispute
regarding the drainage of groundwater, the Massachusetts court stated:
For by the common law the owner of the soil may lawfully
occupy the space above, as well as below the surface, to any
extent which he pleases, unless he has made some grant or
agreement or there has been some statute or police regulation to
the contrary.... But the proprietor, in the absence of any
agreement subjecting his estate to another, may consult his own
convenience in his operations above or below the surface of his
128. Id. at 1235.
129. Tracing the genesis and progress of legal doctrines is often quite interesting. In Day,
the Court is applying the concept of ownership in place to groundwater as it has been
applied previously in the context of oil and gas law. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369
S.W.3d 814, 823-32 (Tex. 2012). But if the concept is traced further back, it appears that
some of the essential building blocks of ownership in place were originally developed in the
context of groundwater disputes (as evidenced by the ensuing cases). Thus, in a certain
sense, the Day case brings the concept of ownership in place full circle and reapplies it to one
of the areas of its early development. See id.
130. Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. 117 (1836).
131. Wilson v. City of New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 (1871).
132. Greenleaf, 35 Mass. at 121. This idea is often summarized by the Latin phrase: ad
coelum et ad inferos, which means "[u]p to the sky and down to the center of the earth."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 42 (9th ed. 2009).
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ground. He may obstruct the light and air above, and cut off the
springs of water below the surface . . . ."'
This is the essence of ownership in place. Unless a landowner parts with his
subterranean rights by a specific conveyance, he retains the full right to
extract and possess the water beneath his land.134
Later, in 1871, the same court expanded on this doctrine in Wilson v.
City of New Bedford.'" Like the Acton court, the Wilson court recognized
that the standards applied to groundwater must differ from those applied to
surface water.'36 Rather than equating groundwater with surface water, the
court likened the water percolating beneath the surface to the rocks and
minerals found beneath the surface.137 Thus, the court again concluded that
a landowner has the right to extract and possess the water beneath his
land.138 Even though ownership in place is not specifically mentioned, this
affirmation of a landowner's rights presupposes the ideological foundation
of ownership in place.
c. Development of ownership in place in the oil and gas law of
Texas
(1) Texas Co. v. Daugherty
The first case in Texas to announce the concept of ownership of oil and
gas in place was Texas Co. v. Daugherty,'" decided in 1915.140 The rationale
in this case sets the framework for how the concept of ownership in place is
applied in Day.' 4 ' In Daugherty, the court grappled with the issue of
whether an oil lease constituted an independent property interest.'4 2 The
133. Greenleaf, 35 Mass. at 121, 123.
134. Id. at 121-23.
135. Wilson v. City of New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 (1871).
136. Id. at 265 ("It is true that the rights of neighboring proprietors of lands in
underground waters which remain still, or naturally percolate through the soil without
forming channels, are very different from their rights in watercourses.").
137. Id. ("The percolating water belongs to the owner of the land, as much as the land
itself, or the rocks and stones in it."(emphasis added)).
138. Id.
139. Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717 (Tex. 1915).
140. Id. at 720.
141. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 829-30 (Tex. 2012).
142. Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 717. It is interesting to note that this case was driven by the
state's desire to subject the owners of oil leases to an independent property tax. Id. at 717,
722. Ironically, in order to justify an independent tax, the state had to admit and even
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court provided a dual perspective on the issue by building a strictly logical
argument and then supplementing this with case precedent from other
jurisdictions. 43 To build its logical argument, the court turned a critical eye
to what was actually being conveyed in the oil-lease at issue." The nature of
the lease was sharply different from an ordinary leasehold estate.1'4 The
property owner did not merely convey a right for the lessee to possess the
premises for a specified amount of time."' Instead, the conveyance declared
that "[t]his lease is not intended as a mere franchise, but is intended as a
conveyance of the property and privileges [pertaining to the minerals
beneath the surface of the property] ."' The court asserted that if oil and
gas were not subject to ownership in place, such a conveyance would be
meaningless. 48 To explain the meaning of this type of conveyance, the court
proposed a simple syllogism: (A) oil and gas are legally classified as
minerals;"' (B) minerals constitute a material interest in the realty where
they are found;' and therefore, (C) a conveyance of oil and gas constitutes
a conveyance of a material interest in the realty where they are found."'
The court fortified its conclusion by pointing out the impossibility of the
contrary.'52 After all, if minerals are treated as part of the property owner's
property rights, then any conveyance of mineral rights must be treated as a
endorse the existence of an independent property interest. Id. at 722. As a result, the burden
placed upon the lessees' financial interests was accompanied by an unexpected benefit to
their property interests. Id. at 719-22.
143. Id. at 718-21.
144. Id. at 718-19.
145. Id. at 718.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 719. The Court also emphasized the fact that the vesting of the oil lease was not
subject to any condition precedent. Id. It vested immediately upon execution of the
instrument of conveyance, just as any other independent property interest would. Id. This
distinction is particularly relevant to the task of harmonizing ownership in place with the
rule of capture. See discussion infra Part IV.
148. Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 720.
149. Id. at 719 ("It is no longer doubted that oil and gas within the ground are
minerals.").
150. Id. ("In place, they lie within the strata of the earth, and necessarily are a part of the
realty.").
151. Id. ("Being a part of the realty while in place, it would seem to logically follow that,
whenever they are conveyed while in that condition or possessing that status, a conveyance
of an interest in the realty results.").
152. Id. at 719-20.
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conveyance of a property right.'" It is inconsistent to classify such a
conveyance as a usufructuary right when the language, intent, and
application of the conveyance are cast in terms of an ownership right.14 For
these reasons, the court asserted that oil and gas must be treated as subject
to ownership in place."'
As an important qualification of this argument, the court pointed out
that the concept of ownership in place is not defeated by the fact that oil
and gas levels beneath the surface may change due to percolation or
subsidence.1 6 The vesting of this property right is not predicated upon the
absolute possession of the object of the interest; rather, the absolute
possession of the object of the interest is predicated by the vesting of the
right to ownership in place.1 7
To bolster this argument, the Daugherty court anchored its reasoning in
case precedent from other jurisdictions'"-citing, for example, Appeal of
Stoughton."' In that case, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
acknowledged that any conveyance of oil and gas rights-regardless of
what it may be called-is effectively "the grant of part of the corpus of the
estate and not of a mere incorporeal right."l6 0 In fact, given the value of oil
and gas, there are many times when the true value of a parcel of land would
be drastically skewed if ownership of the oil and gas beneath the surface was
not considered part of the property interests of the owner.'6 ' Thus, eighteen
years later, in Blakley v. Marshall,'62 the same court unhesitatingly declared
that a conveyance of "the right to remove all the oil in place" from a parcel
of land was legally equivalent to "a sale of a portion of the land. ... "16" This
sale of oil in place theory implies the concept of ownership in place.
153. Id. at 720 ("If these minerals are a part of the realty while in place, as undoubtedly
they are, upon what principle can the ownership of the property interest, which they
constitute while they are beneath or within the land, be other than the ownership of an
interest in the realty?").
154. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 829 (Tex. 2012).
155. Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 720.
156. Id. at 719-20.
157. Id. The significance of this qualification will become apparent below when
ownership in place is compared with the rule of capture. See infra Part IV.A.
158. Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 719-22.
159. Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198 (1878).
160. Stoughton, 88 Pa. at 201.
161. Id. at 201-02.
162. Blakley v. Marshall, 34 A. 564 (Pa. 1896). See Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 721.
163. Blakley, 34 A. at 565 (citing Stoughton, 88 Pa. at 201-02).
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The logical strength of this position is undeniable. Even in states such as
Indiana and Illinois, which stop short of embracing the concept of
ownership in place, courts were nonetheless forced to admit that there is a
distinct substantive property interest involved in the conveyance of an oil
and gas lease.'6 In light of these cases, it is clear that the court's decision in
Texas Co. v. Daugherty was founded upon the well-established tradition
that control of oil and gas was an independently conveyable interest. The
court simply applied the logic of these cases to conclude that oil and gas
were subject to ownership in place.161
(2) Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co.
Not surprisingly, in the decades since Texas Co. v. Daugherty, the
concept of ownership in place has seen numerous extensions and
developments within Texas jurisprudence. Eight years after Daugherty, the
Texas Supreme Court clarified the concept in Stephens County v. Mid-
Kansas Oil & Gas Co.'" In Stephens County, the court endeavored to forge a
more consistent connection between property interests in solid minerals
and property interests in oil and gas.16' Applying reasoning similar to that in
Daugherty, the court asserted that in the classification of oil and gas prior to
their extraction from the land, the two substances ought to be treated as
identical to solid minerals such as iron, coal, and lead.' 8 Building on this
idea, the court stated,
We do not regard it as an open question in this state that gas and
oil in place are minerals and realty, subject to ownership,
severance, and sale, while mebedded [sic] in the sands or rocks
164. See Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 720-22 (citing Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 84
N.E. 53 (Ill. 1908)).
165. Id. at 719-20, 722. It is imperative to remember that ownership in place is not
equivalent to absolute ownership. The court recognizes that absolute ownership does not
vest until actual extraction and possession have taken place. Id. Nevertheless, the court is
emphatic that this does not negate the real ownership interests that vest at the time of
conveyance. Id. at 719-20. As mentioned above, this distinction will become clear below
when the concept of ownership in place is balanced with the rule of capture. See infra Part
IV.
166. Stephens Cnty. v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 254 S.W. 290 (Tex. 1923).
167. Id. at 291-93.
168. Compare Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 719, with Stephens Cnty., 254 S.W. at 291-92.
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beneath the earth's surface, in like manner and to the same
extent as is coal or any other solid mineral."'9
Nevertheless, noting that confusion still existed after Daugherty regarding
the significance of the rights implied by ownership in place, 170 the court
proceeded to explain its affirmation of ownership in place.17 ' Any
conveyance of oil and gas property interests vests exclusive ownership in
the grantee as soon as the instrument is executed. 172 As the new exclusive
owner of these interests, the grantee gains the full rights of possession, use,
and disposition of these resources.'73 Moreover, the grantee gains the full
rights of divestiture and alienation.7 7 Every aspect of dominion over these
resources is treated as transferred unless it is specifically reserved by the
grantor.'7 1 Thus, in Stephens County, the court added substantial solidity
and clarity to the concept of ownership of oil and gas in place.
As in Daugherty, the court in Stephens County carefully compared its
holding to cases from other jurisdictions.'76 Once again, Pennsylvania
featured prominently in this comparison.'7 7 As early as 1858, in Caldwell v.
Fulton,'7 1 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court laid the theoretical foundation
for ownership in place by analyzing the nature of the rights implicated by
property interests in coal: "[T]he grant of a thing can be no more than the
grant of the full and unlimited use of it. So too the general power of disposal
without liability to account is equivalent to ownership itself, it being the
highest attribute of ownership . . . ."17 In terms of the oft-repeated property
law metaphor of a "bundle of sticks," once a party holds the sticks of
unlimited use and free alienability for a portion of land, that party may
claim full ownership over that portion. When these rights are present,
169. Stephens Cnty., 254 S.W. at 292.
170. Id. (stating that although the question of ownership of oil and gas in place was
decided beyond reasonable doubt in Daugherty, the parties to the present case insisted that
oil and gas leases conveyed only "incorporeal hereditaments" rather than vested real
property interests).
171. Id. at 292-96.
172. Id. at 292.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 292-93, 296.
177. Id. at 292-93.
178. Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475 (1858).
179. Id. at 484.
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ownership vests immediately-even if the conveyed portion of land
happens to be below the surface.8 o
In keeping with Daugherty, the Stephens County court reiterated its
approval of the Pennsylvania court's conclusion in Appeal of Stoughtonm..:
subterranean property rights are not incorporeal and contingent; they are
corporeal and definite.'82 The court also introduced a lengthy progression of
Pennsylvania precedents building on this idea.' These precedents led the
Stephens County court to adopt Pennsylvania's conclusion that ownership
in place gives the owner the absolute right "to sell, to use, to give away, or to
squander, as in the case of his other property."' By embracing the rationale
of the Pennsylvania courts, the Stephens County court revealed that Texas's
endorsement of the concept of ownership in place had grown into a robust
and well-defined rule.
d. Summary of ownership in place
As mentioned previously, the Day court's application of ownership in
place to groundwater stands in contradiction to the historical trend among
the states.' At the turn of the twentieth-century, states generally affirmed a
property owner's exclusive property interest in the groundwater beneath the
surface of his land.186 Nevertheless, this trend has changed radically over the
past century: "[A]s a general rule today, groundwater is considered to be
owned by the public at large, rather than by the individual landowner, and
is therefore subject to significant public supervision and control.""' Until
the Court announced its decision in Day, it was unclear whether Texas
180. Id. at 488.
181. Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198 (1878).
182. Stephens Cnty., 254 S.W. at 292-93. See Stoughton, 88 Pa. at 201-02.
183. Stephens Cnty., 254 S.W. at 292-94 (citing McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949 (Pa. 1912);
Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 74 A. 207 (Pa. 1909); Jennings v. Bloomfield, 49 A. 135, 136
(Pa. 1901); Blakley v. Marshall, 34 A. 564, 565 (Pa. 1896); Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719-
20 (Pa. 1893); Del. L. & W. Ry. Co. v. Sanderson, 1 A. 394 (Pa. 1885); Appeal of Stoughton,
88 Pa. 198, 201 (1878); Armstrong v. Caldwell, 53 Pa. 284, 288 (1866); Caldwell v. Copeland,
37 Pa. 427, 430 (1860); Caldwell v. Fulton, 31 Pa. 475, 483-88 (1858)).
184. Id. at 293 (quoting Hague v. Wheeler, 27 A. 714, 719-20 (Pa. 1893)).
185. WADLEY, supra note 8, § 50.11(a).
186. Id. (citing Stoner v. Patten, 63 S.E. 897 (Ga. 1909)).
187. Id. (citing Russell Adams, Updating Groundwater Law: New Wine in Old Bottles, 39
OHIO ST. L. REv. 520 (1978)).
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would follow this trend or apply ownership in place to groundwater.18 As it
will be discussed below, Day's assertion that groundwater is owned in place
is an important step forward in the search for consistency in the theory of
groundwater rights.'89
2. Rule of Capture
The rule of capture is another essential doctrine that the Texas Supreme
Court articulates in Day alongside the concept of ownership in place.' 90 But
unlike the court's interpretation and application of ownership in place, the
court's interpretation and application of the rule of capture is not a matter
of first impression for the Texas Supreme Court.'9' On the contrary, the
Day court stands squarely in a line of Texas Supreme Court precedents that
stretch back to Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. East,'92 which was decided in
1904.1' Nevertheless, the court's affirmation of the rule of capture is closely
akin to its affirmation of ownership in place in that both positions are
rooted in solid legal traditions,'94 and both positions stand in contradiction
to the modern jurisprudential trend. '
a. Introduction and basic definition of the rule of capture
In order to understand the court's rationale in Day, it is helpful to begin
by distinguishing two of the major approaches to the rule of capture and
clarifying which approach the court adopts.'96 The earlier and stricter
188. Susana E. Canseco, Landowners' Rights in Texas Groundwater: How and Why Texas
Courts Should Determine Landowners Do Not Own Groundwater in Place, 60 BAYLOR L. REV.
491, 495-96 (2008).
189. See infra Part IV.A.
190. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 823-29 (Tex. 2012).
191. Id. at 823-25.
192. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
193. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 823.
194. See id. at 823-32.
195. WADLEY, supra note 8, § 50.11(a), (f) n.631. See also 3 WATER AND WATER RIGHTS §
20.07 (Robert E. Beck et al. eds., 1991 ed. 2003 repl. vol.) [hereinafter WATER RIGHTS].
196. While there are other approaches to the rule of capture than the two summarized
here, these two approaches are sufficient to set the context for the Court's discussion in Day.
See WADLEY, supra note 8, § 50.11(g)-(j). In the interest of thoroughness, however, it is
significant to note that some have suggested the doctrine of correlative rights as an
alternative to the rule of capture. Id. at § 50.11(g). Essentially, this doctrine limits a
landowner's groundwater rights to the reasonable share of the aquifer that is allocable to the
landowner's specific acreage. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 396 (9th ed. 2009). Interestingly,
even before Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day was decided, Susana Elena Canseco, writing
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approach to the rule of capture is known as the "English rule," the "absolute
dominion rule," or the "absolute ownership doctrine."' According to the
English rule,
The landowner could extract unlimited quantities of water from
the land, regardless of injury caused to others, so long as no
harm was caused by malice and no water was
wasted.... [W]ater . .. was accessed under a "capture" theory:
whoever actually withdrew the water was entitled to it. Thus, one
landowner could actually withdraw water from beneath a
neighbor's tract. And, since the right to extract the water was
considered "absolute," the landowner who owned the land from
which the water was being extracted had no rights against the
adjoining landowner who was actually doing the extracting.198
Later on, the American courts endeavored to soften this approach to the
rule of capture by placing greater restrictions on a landowner's ability to
withdraw water from underneath his land when such a withdrawal was
unreasonable. 9
Unlike the absolute ownership rule,... the water extracted under
this rule must be used on overlying land and the use must be
reasonably related to the natural use of the land. If these
conditions are met, the landowner could use as much water as
desired regardless of the adverse effects to other landowners. The
sale or use of water on distant lands was considered
unreasonable where it impaired the groundwater supply of
for Baylor Law Review, suggested that it would be impossible to harmonize ownership of
groundwater in place with the correlative rights doctrine. Canseco, supra note 188, at 521-
22. From her perspective, any attempt to combine these two doctrines would require the
Court to ignore critical differences between groundwater and oil and gas, and to neglect
important regulatory needs in the area of water usage and management. Id. This apparent
difficulty will be addressed later on. See discussion infra Part III.
197. WADLEY, supra note 8, § 50.11(e); WATER RIGHTS, supra note 195, § 20.03.
Unfortunately, the plurality of terms used to refer to a single approach to the rule of capture
can generate confusion. For the sake of clarity, the author will endeavor to use "the English
rule" as the default term to refer to the earlier and stricter approach to the rule of capture.
Nevertheless, in special contexts or in quotations, the author may employ "the absolute
dominion rule" or "the absolute ownership doctrine" to refer to the same concept.
198. WADLEY, supra note 8, § 50.11(e).
199. Id. at§50.11(f).
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another landowner. Likewise, courts have generally considered
waste to be unreasonable per se.200
Eventually, this alternative became known as the "reasonable use rule" or
the "American rule."201' As it will be seen, Texas has strictly adhered to the
English rule and consistently rejected the American rule.202
b. Development of the rule of capture in other jurisdictions
(1) Development of the rule of capture in English
common law
As with the concept of ownership in place, the Day court explains the
rule of capture in light of a venerable body of case precedent,203 beginning
with the eighteenth-century English case, Acton v. Blundell.204 In Acton, the
English Court of the Exchequer addressed whether a landowner could be
held liable for damages when his use of underground water led to a
subsidence of the water supply and the eventual exhaustion of his
neighbor's well.205 The court held that the injury sustained by the neighbor
in the loss of his subterranean water did not give him a legally cognizable
claim against the landowner since the landowner had rightfully taken
possession of the water by capture.206 Since he captured it by exercising his
rights over his own property, the water was rightfully his. 207 Essentially,
ownership of the land includes the right to possess any water that may be
underneath the surface, regardless of whether this water is there by
percolation from a neighboring property, or whether its removal will cause
subsidence in the water underneath a neighboring property.208
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at § 50.11(f) n.631.
203. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 823-29 (Tex. 2012).
204. Id. at 824-25 (citing Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223).
205. Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1223-24.
206. Id. at 1235.
207. Id. ("[T]he person who owns the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there
found to his own purposes at his free will and pleasure; and... if, in the exercise of such
right, he intercepts or drains off the water collected from underground springs in his
neighbour's well, this inconvenience to his neighbour falls within the description of damnum
absque injurid, which cannot become the ground of an action.").
208. WATER RIGHTS, supra note 195, § 20.03 ("As the law stands, the right of the
landowner to abstract subterranean water flowing in undefined channels beneath his
land ... appears to us, in the light of [common law] authorities, to be exercisable regardless
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Notwithstanding legislative and regulatory restraints, the English courts
upheld this approach to the rule of capture throughout the twentieth-
century.209 For example, in Langbrook Properties, Ltd. v. Surrey County
Council,210 the court reviewed its precedents regarding absolute dominion
and concluded,
[S]ince it is not actionable to cause damage by the abstraction of
underground water, even where this is done maliciously, it would
seem illogical that it should be actionable if it were done
carelessly. Where there is no duty not to injure for the sake of
inflicting injury, there cannot... be a duty to take care not to
inflict the same injury.2 11
From this standpoint, the rule of capture entitles a landowner to possess
and use the water underneath his land without any thought for how his
usage might affect his neighbor's water supply.212 Thus, the English rule
gives a landowner an absolute right to extract and capture any water that is
underneath his land.213
(2) Development of the rule of capture in American
jurisdictions
As the Day court builds upon the English common law understanding of
the rule of capture, it incorporates important contributions from other
American jurisdictions.214 For example, the Day court cites the Supreme
of the consequences, whether physical or pecuniary, to his neighbors." (quoting Stephens v.
Anglian Water Auth., [1987] 3 All E.R. 379 (C.A.))).
209. Id.
210. Langbrook Properties, Ltd. v. Surrey Cnty. Council, [1969] 1 W.L.R. 161.
211. WATER RIGHTS, supra note 195, § 20.03 (quoting Langbrook Props., 3 All E.R. at
1439-40).
212. Id. Given the breadth of power that this rule affords to individual landowners, it has
been fittingly described as a "stark view." Id.; see also Chasemore v. Richards, [1857] 157 E.R.
71.
213. WATER RIGHTS, supra note 195, § 20.03.
214. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 825-26 (Tex. 2012). This subsection
focuses on Frazier v. Brown and on the cases incorporated into that decision; however, the
Day decision also references Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520 (1866). Day includes the following
quote from Pixley:
An owner of soil may divert percolating water, consume or cut it off, with
impunity. It is the same as land, and cannot be distinguished in law from land.
So the owner of land is the absolute owner of the soil and of percolating water,
which is a part of, and not different from, the soil. No action lies against the
2013] 55
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Court of Ohio's affirmation of the rule of capture in Frazier v. Brown,2 15
which was decided in 1861.216 Standing on a foundation of multi-
jurisdictional case precedent,217 the Frazier court noted that there were two
public policy considerations that supported its affirmation of the English
rule.2 18
First, it is impossible to map, track, and calculate the rate and amount of
groundwater percolating from one parcel to another with any degree of
accuracy.219 Such a task "would be involved in hopeless uncertainty, and
would be, therefore, practically impossible."2 2 0 In fact, this impossibility
serves as the dividing line between surface water rights and groundwater
rights.221 After all, if subterranean water flowed in distinguishable channels,
then the same laws could govern it as surface water, and groundwater
disputes would be radically simplified. Unfortunately, however, this type of
owner for interfering with or destroying percolating or circulating water under
the earth's surface.
Day, 369 S.W.3d at 826 (quoting Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279, 280-81 (Tex.
1904) (quoting Pixley, 35 N.Y. at 527)). The placement of this quote in the Day decision is
significant because it is used to support the rule of capture, not to present the principle of
ownership in place. Id. In fact, the Court states that Pixley articulates rights under the rule of
capture that can be maintained "irrespective" of whether ownership in place applies. Id. The
inconsistencies inherent in such an interpretation will be highlighted later on. See infra Parts
III, IV.A.
215. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861).
216. See Day, 369 S.W.3d at 825. The manner in which the Frazier court framed the issue
is particularly helpful:
The question then is, whether-in the absence of all rights derived either from
contract or legislation-a landowner can have any legal claims in respect to
subsurface waters which, without any distinct and definite channel, ooze, filter,
and percolate from adjoining lands into his own, when such waters are
diverted, retained, or abstracted by the owner of such adjoining lands in the use
of his property, for any object of either taste or profit, even though the use may
be accompanied by a malicious intent to injure his neighbor by means of such
use?
Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 304. Of course, the Court answered this question in the negative,
stating that any damage to neighboring land that resulted from a landowner's extraction of
underground water was merely a damnum absque injuria. Id.
217. See Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 303-10 (1861).
218. Id. at 311.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id. at 300-02.
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subterranean water flow is so rare that the Frazier court addressed it as a
"curious speculation" instead of a reality.222
Second, if courts abandoned the rule of capture in favor of a correlative
rights approach to groundwater, it would stymie the progress of
commercial and private land development.2 23 This is illustrated by two of
the cases summarized by the Frazier court: Greenleaf v. Francis2 4 and Roath
v. Driscol 25 -cases from Massachusetts and Connecticut, respectively. 226 in
Greenleaf, a landowner drilled a well in close proximity to his neighbor's
property, causing her well to run dry.227 Notwithstanding the seemingly
obvious connection between the defendant's gain and the plaintiffs loss, the
court held that, in accordance with the rule of capture, the defendant had a
right to the water that he captured from beneath his land.228 The court
reasoned that "'the defendant had no means of knowing that the plaintiffs
well was supplied by springs in the defendant's soil, until the defendant dug
for water there for his own use."' 229 According to the court, to hold a
defendant liable in such circumstances would handicap landowners by
forcing them to anticipate how their drilling might affect the groundwater
supply and would encourage courts to engage in speculation regarding a
landowner's knowledge, intent, and motivation regarding his use of
groundwater. 23 0 To avoid such a result, the Greenleaf court indicated that
each landowner "may consult his own convenience in his operations above
or below the surface of his ground."2 ' Similarly, in Roath, the court warned
that if landowners could not exercise their groundwater rights through
capture, then,
one man, by sinking a well .., might prevent the sinking of other
wells, and the improvement of the neighborhood, . . . and even
222. Id. at 302.
223. Id. at 311.
224. Greenleaf v. Francis, 35 Mass. 117 (1836).
225. Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533 (1850).
226. See Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 305-08.
227. Greenleaf 35 Mass. at 117-18; see also Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 305.
228. Greenleaf 35 Mass. at 122-23; see also Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 305-06.
229. Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 306 (quoting Greenleaf, 35 Mass. at 122).
230. See id. at 311; see also Greenleaf, 35 Mass. at 122-23.
231. Greenleaf 35 Mass. at 123.
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the opening of mines of metal or coal; as the water might not
percolate, with the same freeness or abundance as before.232
Thus, once again, the court held that a landowner's right to capture the
water beneath the surface of his land is not restricted by the unforeseeable
effects that his activities might have on the percolation and subsidence of
water beneath neighboring parcels.233
c. Development of the rule of capture in Texas
(1) Houston & T. C. Railway. Co. v. East
As noted previously, Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. East234 is the
landmark case in which the Texas Supreme Court adopted the English rule
of capture and applied it to groundwater rights.235 Since the Day decision
anchors its analysis of the rule of capture in the East decision, it is
important to have a thorough understanding of East's articulation of this
rule.236 In East, the court adopted the rationales stated in Acton v. Blundelp37
and Frazier v. Brown.238 239 According to these precedents, a landowner is
perfectly free to dig on his property and use any of the water he secures in
whatever manner he pleases. 240 This means that a landowner's right to
capture the water found beneath his land is not dependent upon the place of
the water's origin or the effect of its removal.24' Thus, the rule of capture
justifies a landowner in capturing water beneath his land even if it results in
the exhaustion of the water supply beneath a neighboring parcel. 24 2 In the
words of the court: "The mere quantity of water taken by the owner from
his land has nowhere been held to affect the question."243
232. Roath v. Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533, 542 (1850).
233. Id. at 541-44.
234. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
235. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 823 (Tex. 2012).
236. See id. at 823-29. Throughout Day's discussion of the rule of capture, the court
makes repeated references to East and seeks to interpret subsequent precedents in light of the
fundamental principles pronounced in East. Id.
237. Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223.
238. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861).
239. East, 81 S.W. at 280-81.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 281.
243. Id.
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Moreover, the East court asserted that this right is not contingent upon a
landowner's underlying motivation in capturing the water 244 or his
intentions for using the water after it is captured. 245 The court supported
these assertions with references to case precedent from England, Iowa, and
New York.246 In fact, the court asserted that the English rule of capture it
was articulating had been "recognized and followed in the courts of
England, and probably by all the courts of last resort in this country before
which the question has come, except the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire."247 On the basis of these authorities, the East court held that
Texas groundwater should thereafter be governed by the rule of capture.248
(2) The progeny of Houston & T. C. Railway. Co. v.
East
Fifty years after East was decided, the Texas Supreme Court again
addressed the question of the rule of capture in light of the increasing shift
toward the "American rule" mentioned previously.249 In City of Corpus
Christi v. City of Pleasanton,250 the court noted that the "American rule"
originated in the New Hampshire case Bassett v. Salisbury Manufacturing
Co. 251  and that "[t]he modern tendency is toward this ... rule."25 2
Nevertheless, the court in Corpus Christi declined to deviate from the
English rule and refused to join the modern trend, declaring that the
holding in East was "considered and deliberate." 25 3 Moreover, the court in
244. Id. at 280 ("[Tlhe person who owns the surface may dig therein and apply all that is
there found to his own purposes, at his free will and pleasure...." (emphasis added)
(quoting Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235)).
245. Id. at 281 ("So the authorities generally state that the use of the water for
manufacturing, brewing, and like purposes is within the right of the owner of the soil,
whatever may be its effect upon his neighbor's wells and springs.").
246. Id. (citing Hougan v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 35 Iowa 558 (1872); Pixley
v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520 (1866); Chasemore v. Richards, [1857] 157 E.R. 71).
247. Id. at 280.
248. Edward Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 823-26 (Tex. 2012).
249. See supra Part II.B.2.a.
250. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955).
251. Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862).
252. Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 800-01.
253. Id. ("With both rules before it, this Court, in 1904, adopted, unequivocally, the
'English' or 'Common Law' rule.... The opinion in the case shows quite clearly that the
court weighed the merits of the two rules .. . ." (emphasis added)).
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Corpus Christi expanded the rule of capture to include a landowner's right
to transport and store the water he captured:
It thus appears that under the common-law rule adopted in this
state an owner of land could use all of the percolating water he
could capture from wells on his land for whatever beneficial
purposes he needed it, on or off of the land, and could likewise
sell it to others for use off of the land and outside of the basin
where produced, just as he could sell any other species of
property. We know of no common-law limitation of the means
of transporting the water to the place of use.254
Thus, a landowner holds vested rights in the water that he captures, and he
is free to use it, move it, and keep it as he pleases.255
Following these affirmations of the rule of capture, the Texas Supreme
Court tempered its position in Friendswood Development Co. v. Smith-
Southwest Industries, Inc.256 Looking back to the East decision, the
Friendswood court noted that "the [East] Court mentioned only waste and
malice as possible limitations to the rule [of capture] ."257 The Friendswood
court acknowledged that waste and malice were the only historically
recognized limits on the rule of capture and ruled accordingly.258
Nevertheless, the Friendswood court declared that these limitations would
be expanded in future cases to allow a cause of action against a landowner
for the negligent withdrawal of groundwater:259
As far as we can determine, there is no other use of private real
property which enjoys such an immunity from liability under the
law of negligence.. . .Our consideration of this case convinces us
that there is no valid reason to continue this special immunity
insofar as it relates to future subsidence proximately caused by
negligence in the manner which wells are drilled or produced in
the future. It appears that the ownership and rights of all
landowners will be better protected against subsidence if each
254. Id. at 802.
255. Id. at 801-02.
256. Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Sw. Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1978).
257. Id. at 25.
258. Id. at 25-29. The Court supported its analysis with citations to the Restatement
(First) of Torts §§ 818, 820 (1939) and cases from England, D.C., Ohio, Maryland, and
various Texas State and Federal courts. Id.
259. Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 29-31.
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has the duty to produce water from his land in a manner that will
not negligently damage or destroy the lands of others.2 60
Thus, in an effort to achieve uniformity in a landowner's legal
responsibilities and to better balance the rights of landowners as a class, the
Friendswood court moderated the rule of capture.26'
As the years have passed, the Texas Supreme Court has continued to
admit that the rule of capture is steadily becoming obsolete in many
jurisdictions; however, the Court has consistently upheld the theory.2 62 In
Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc.,263 for example, the Court
repeated the classic statement of the rule of capture2" and clarified its
contemporary significance.2 65 The Sipriano court pointed out that, when the
constitutional, legislative, and regulatory developments that were made
during the twentieth-century are considered alongside the judicial
refinement of the rule of capture that occurred during the same period, it is
evident that the rule of capture was foundational to the other developments
of Texas water law.2 66 Thus, the court concluded:
It would be improper for courts to intercede at this time by
changing the common-law framework within which the
Legislature has attempted to craft regulations to meet this state's
groundwater-conservation needs.... [W]e are reluctant to make
so drastic a change as abandoning our rule of capture and
moving into the arena of water-use regulation by judicial fiat.267
This conclusion sealed Texas's view of the rule of capture with respect to
groundwater until the issue was resurrected and reexamined in Day.26 8
260. Id. at 30.
261. Id.at29-31.
262. See, e.g., City of Sherman v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Texas, 643 S.W.2d 681, 686 (Tex.
1983) ("[T]he Court [has] had an opportunity to reconsider the propriety of th[e] rule [of
capture] and [has] refused to depart from it. Despite criticism of this theory, it remains the
law today." (referring to Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 21)).
263. Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999).
264. See id. at 76.
265. Id. at 76-80.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 80. It is ironic and puzzling to compare the Sipriano court's reluctance to
change the rule of capture by "judicial fiat" with the Friendswood court's eagerness to place
an additional limitation on the rule of capture by "judicial fiat." Compare id., with
Friendswood, 576 S.W.2d at 29-31.
268. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 826-28 (Tex. 2012).
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d. Summary of the rule of capture
In light of the venerable tradition surrounding the rule of capture, it is
not surprising that the Day court reaffirmed this important doctrine. At the
same time, as noted previously, the traditions surrounding both the rule of
capture and the concept of ownership in place have been jettisoned by
modern legal trends. Thus, the rule of capture has been abandoned by a
majority of modern American jurisdictions. 269 In fact, Texas now stands
alone as "the only major state that follows the judicially crafted rule of
capture regarding groundwater." 270 Nevertheless, for the Texas Supreme
Court, the rationale behind the rule of capture remains compelling, and the
court consistently continues to apply this rule to groundwater oil and gas.271
At this point, it is doubtful that the court will ever-or should ever-follow
the modern trend by overturning the rule of capture and moving toward an
alternative theory such as the correlative rights doctrine. Hence, the key
issue presented by Day's reaffirmation of the rule of capture is not
determining how it relates to the existing precedential framework of
groundwater rights but how it should be harmonized with the expanding
theoretical framework of groundwater rights. This issue will be addressed
later on.
III. PROBLEM
As with all legal theories, the concept of ownership in place and the rule
of capture are susceptible to critical variations of interpretation and
application. Unfortunately, the Day court did not articulate these two
principles with enough detail and nuance to establish which variant
interpretation and application it was adopting and why. On the surface,
there is tremendous tension between these two principles.272 Moreover, as it
has been seen, each theory has its own variegated history in Texas case law.
If the holdings of the Day court are going to be developed effectively in
future cases, these problems must be addressed.
269. WATER RIGHTS, supra note 195, § 20.04, 20.06, 20.07(b).
270. Kaiser, supra note 16, at 473.
271. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 823-29.
272. See Canseco, supra note 188, at 525 (concluding that "Texas's rule of capture was
always inconsistent with the idea that landowners own groundwater in place because the law
did not protect that ownership.").
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A. The Equivocal Nature of Texas's View of Ownership in Place
The concept of ownership in place is a standard doctrine in Texas
property law and jurisprudence; however, its application to groundwater is
new. By applying a historic concept in such an innovative manner, the
Texas Supreme Court invites scrutiny of the consistency of its logic and
legal reasoning. If ownership in place is not properly defined and
interpreted, it can present serious theoretical conundrums.
1. Difficulties with the Basic Characteristics of Groundwater
Perhaps the largest difficulty with ownership of groundwater in place
springs from the intrinsic characteristics of groundwater. Groundwater is
constantly moving, oozing, percolating, filtering, rising, and falling,
"without any distinct, definite, and known channel."273 In fact, the Day
court explicitly adopts the rationale of the Ohio Supreme Court in Frazier v.
Brown, acknowledging that,
the existence, origin, movement, and course of such waters, and
the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so
secret, occult, and concealed that an attempt to administer any
set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless
uncertainty, and would, therefore, be practically impossible."'
This problem is accentuated by the unique nature of the Edwards
Aquifer. As noted previously, the fluctuation of water levels within the
Edwards Aquifer is even more volatile than that of other aquifers.275 In some
areas, the aquifer has a hydraulic conductivity of over 7000 feet per day.276
Nevertheless, the Day court confidently asserts that property owners have
constitutionally recognizable rights in the groundwater beneath the surface
of their land: "Groundwater rights are property rights subject to
constitutional protection, whatever difficulties may lie in determining
adequate compensation for a taking."27 7 Essentially, the court affirms a
constitutional property right while simultaneously acknowledging that such
a right may be practically unquantifiable.
This elicits a litany of questions: If groundwater is constantly in flux, how
can any fixed property values be established? And if there are no fixed
273. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 302-03 (1861).
274. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 825 (quoting Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 311).
275. EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTH., supra note 13, at 5-6.
276. GEORGE, MACE, & PETROSSIAN, supra note 20, at 30.
277. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 833.
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property values and distinct water levels, what does ownership in place
actually entail? 278 If there is no solid knowledge of the nature and movement
of groundwater, is ownership of groundwater in place even a meaningful
concept? Has the court embraced a hopeless uncertainty and a practical
impossibility? If the nature of groundwater is taken seriously, then it
appears that ownership of groundwater in place is a vacuous affirmation of
an unquantifiable property interest.
2. Difficulties with the Established View of Groundwater
Additional problems arise when the concept of ownership in place is
considered in conjunction with the established forms and structure of
groundwater management. Two specific difficulties should be noted. First,
it is firmly established that, in light of the rule of capture, property owners
sustain no legally cognizable injury when the water beneath their land
subsides, drains, or percolates away on account of a neighbor's drilling and
extraction.279 The Day court did not hesitate to affirm this fact when it cited
Pixley v. Clark: "'An owner of soil may divert percolating water, consume or
cut it off, with impunity.... No action lies against the owner for interfering
with or destroying percolating or circulating water under the earth's
surface."' 280 The court attempted to clarify its use of Pixley by explaining
that "[w] hatever the New York court may have intended by this statement,
we could have meant only that a landowner is the absolute owner of
groundwater flowing at the surface from its well, even if the water originated
beneath the land of another."281 Unfortunately, this clarification only
worsens the court's dilemma: if ownership of water vests in the person that
brings it to the surface without any regard for the prior position of the water
while it was in place, then what becomes of ownership in place? If one
property owner can deprive another of his groundwater with impunity,
then of what value is the concept of ownership in place? The rights of
278. Canseco, supra note 188, at 510 ("While this statement of the rules of absolute
ownership and capture might sound appealing to the drainer, it is less appealing to the
drainee; under the above-described rule, he owns his groundwater too, and yet the rule of
capture denies him a remedy when it is drained, so in what sense does he own it?").
279. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 824-28. This principle was affirmed in Acton v. Blundell,
Langbrook Properties, Ltd. v. Surrey County Council, Greenleaf v. Francis, Roath v. Driscoll,
and Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. East, all of which were discussed and summarized above.
See supra Part II.B.2.
280. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 826 (quoting Houston & T. C. Railway Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279,
280-81 (Tex. 1904) (quoting Pixley v. Clark, 35 N.Y. 520, 527 (1866))).
281. Id. (emphasis added).
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ownership appear to be worthless if their loss is a mere damnum absque
injuria.282
Second, the concept of ownership in place has the potential to
undermine regulatory schemes such as the one embodied in the Edwards
Aquifer Authority Act. If every property owner has absolute rights to the
groundwater beneath the surface of his land, and if a regulatory agency is
committed to compensating property owners for any deprivation of their
rights,283 then entities like the Edwards Aquifer Authority will be unable to
enforce any regulations on the extraction and use of groundwater without
first compensating every property owner for the resultant deprivation.
Given the unquantifiability of groundwater values and the expense of
constitutional takings litigation, such an application of ownership in place
would cripple any efforts for the effective management of groundwater.
B. The Latent Problems with Texas's View of the Rule of Capture
Notwithstanding the fact that the rule of capture is a venerable fixture in
Texas property law and jurisprudence, there are numerous problems that
can arise from imbalanced interpretations and applications of this principle.
Like the concept of ownership in place, the rule of capture has conflicting
implications that must be clarified, limited, and avoided in order for the
principle to be developed effectively.
1. Difficulties with the Vesting of Ownership
Ironically, the key weakness of the rule of capture lies within its greatest
strength-its ability to provide a definite time at which groundwater rights
vest and become legally cognizable. The problem is not complex, but it is
logically inescapable: If ownership rights do not vest until after
groundwater has been reduced to actual possession by capture, then there
are no property interests that support extracting the water in the first place.
Thus, in a very real sense, it is a theoretical free-for-all before capture takes
place. Of course, if groundwater were an unlimited resource, then this
would not present a problem. But given the scarcity of groundwater, this
aspect of the rule of capture can lead to serious conflict.
282. See Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235.
283. The Edwards Aquifer Authority Act clearly states that "[tihe legislature intends that
just compensation be paid if implementation of this article causes a taking of private
property .... " EAAA § 1.07.
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An excellent illustration of this difficulty is found in City of Corpus
Christi v. City of Pleasanton.284 In the mid- 1900s, the City of Corpus Christi
began purchasing water from the Lower Nueces River Supply District,
which was 118 miles away.285 The Supply District used four wells to pump
water out of the Carrizo-Wilcox Aquifer and into the Nueces River so that it
could be collected downstream by the City and stored in a settling basin.286
If the wells were pumped at full capacity, they would "discharge water into
the river at the rate of ten million gallons of water per day.""'
Unfortunately, however, there was evidence that 63-74% of this water
"escaped through evaporation, transpiration and seepage and never reached
its destination to be put to a beneficial use."288 Notwithstanding the fact that
such intensive pumping deprived surrounding property owners of water
that they could have used beneficially, the court held that the plaintiffs had
no actionable claim since the rule of capture gave the City and the Supply
District the right to extract water as they pleased .2 9 As the dissent pointed
out, under the rule of capture, there is no recourse for the surrounding
property owners:
In the field of water law, there is no consolidation [sic] to be
found in the law of capture. Of what value would it be to the
plaintiffs to offset defendants' wells and produce an enormous
amount of water for which they have no use? This would further
deplete the reservoir, reduce the pressure, and lower the standing
level with consequent increase of pumping expense. Why further
injure their own wells? To refer them to the law of capture in this
situation is simply to say that one who has been injured may go
and inflict a like injury upon his neighbor. If the law of capture
has any true application to underground water, it is an extremely
limited one.290
284. City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955).
Interestingly, this case was also filed in Atascosa County-almost fifty years before Day filed
his complaint against the Edwards Aquifer Authority. Id.
285. Id. at 799-800.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 800.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 801-02.
290. Id. at 808 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
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In such a situation, the rule of capture only encourages the petty
multiplication of well-pumping wars or the complacent relinquishment of
valuable groundwater. Neither alternative respects the property rights
involved or optimizes the resources at stake.
2. Difficulties with the Regulation of Ownership
Furthermore, such a strict interpretation of the rule of capture opens the
door for dangerous regulatory abuses. After all, if ownership rights do not
vest in the property owner until he has extracted and captured the
groundwater beneath his property, then regulations on extraction and
capture would constitute pre-ownership restrictions and would not deprive
a property owner of any vested rights. Consequently, the government would
be free to impose any regulations that it desired without having to address
the issue of constitutional takings. Although statute and custom may guard
against such an intrusion, legal logic does not.
For example, according to the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, "waste"
includes "withdrawal of underground water from the aquifer at a rate and
in an amount that causes or threatens to cause intrusion into the reservoir
of water unsuitable for agricultural, gardening, domestic, or stock raising
purposes."29 ' If property owners do not have an underlying, preexisting
property right in the groundwater beneath their land, then the Edwards
Aquifer Authority may infuse this definition with its own understanding of
what "causes or threatens to cause intrusion into the reservoir," without
needing to fear any legal repercussions.2 92 Functionally, groundwater would
then be rationed according to the valuations of the Authority. Of course, the
Day court makes it clear that the doctrine of constitutional takings renders
this interpretation and application of the rule of capture impossible.2 93
Nevertheless, although the court interprets and applies the rule of capture
properly, it fails to articulate the rule clearly and consistently. This is
problematic.
IV. PROPOSAL
In spite of the aforementioned difficulties, the concept of ownership in
place and the rule of capture are not inherently antithetical. This position is
stressed by the Day court: "But while the rule of capture does not entail
291. EAAA § 1.03(21)(A).
292. See id.
293. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 843-44 (Tex. 2012).
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ownership of groundwater in place, neither does it preclude such
ownership."294 Thus, after the Day decision, the task moving forward is to
clarify the meaning of ownership in place and rule of capture so that courts,
legislatures, and agencies may work together with a consistent
understanding of the theory of groundwater rights.
A. The Process of Clarifying Theoretical Inconsistencies
This Proposal will clarify the theoretical inconsistencies of the Day
decision by addressing three issues. First, it will outline the proper meaning
of ownership in place. This is the foundational doctrine on which the rule of
capture and all groundwater regulatory schemes must rest. Second, the
Proposal will outline the proper meaning of the rule of capture. This rule is
only effective when its intended purpose is recognized and respected. Third,
the Proposal will outline the practical ramifications that should result from
a proper understanding of ownership in place and the rule of capture.
1. The Proper Meaning of Ownership in Place
In order to frame the proper understanding of the concept of ownership
in place, it is essential to remember that ownership is inescapable. Property
rights must vest at all times.295 Therefore, the question is not whether
groundwater is susceptible to ownership in place, but who will claim
ownership of groundwater in place. Either the collective public represented
by the state will claim ownership, or individual property owners will claim
ownership.2 96 Those who oppose the Day court's adoption of individual
ownership in place will necessarily default to some form of collective
ownership.297 This does not answer any questions; it simply recasts them in
a different context.
Properly understood, the assertion of private ownership of groundwater
in place is not a vacuous affirmation of an unquantifiable right.
Notwithstanding the continuous fluctuation in groundwater levels, there is
quantifiable value in groundwater. In fact, the factual and legal context in
which groundwater disputes are framed demonstrates that modern
294. Id. at 828. The court opens and closes its discussion of the rule of capture with the
assertion that this rule is consistent with the concept of ownership in place. Id. at 823, 828.
295. Marvin W. Jones & Timothy C. Williams, A New Day in Texas: The Implications of
Day v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, B.N.A. Toxics LAW REPORTER, 2012 WL 2831853
(B.N.A.), July 11, 2012.
296. Id.
297. Id.
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landowners and regulative agencies possess a significant body of knowledge
regarding the value, nature, and movement of groundwater.2 98 As Justice
Wilson noted in his dissent to City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, it
is a mistake to ignore the advances of modern technology:
These cases [Frazier v. Brown and Acton v. Blundell] were
decided ... before the development of most of our present
knowledge of geology and hydrology and there has been a great
advance in knowledge since these decisions.... Th[e] dire
prediction[s] [contained in these cases]-like much prophecy-
overlooked the possibility of advance in knowledge and
technique. It is understandable that this rationale should appeal
to this court in 1904 but I regret to see us reaffirm it ... especially
in view of the development since 1904 of our comprehensive
knowledge and experience in oil and gas regulation.2 99
If there was any truth in Justice Wilson's words in 1955, there is certainly
truth in them in the twenty-first-century. A lack of exact knowledge does
not imply a lack of any knowledge, and a lack of a precise remedy does not
preclude the existence of any remedy. With the information available
through modern technology, courts and regulative agencies are better
equipped than ever before to defend property rights by expanding a
property owner's ability to take legal action against wasteful, malicious, and
wanton conduct. By the vigorous use of this information, courts can make
the concept of ownership in place a practical reality, not merely a
theoretical construct.
But even as a theoretical construct, the concept of ownership in place is
crucial to maintaining groundwater rights. In light of the Day decision, it is
helpful to reconsider the concept of ownership in place in terms of an
analogy between groundwater and wild animals.300 The idea behind this
298. Compare City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 805 (Tex.
1955) (Wilson, J., dissenting), with Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861). Only fools
argue over something that they know nothing about. The fact that researchers, scientists, and
others have been able to define, map, and attempt to manage the fluctuating levels of
groundwater indicates that the movement of underground water is far from being the
"secret, occult and concealed" mystery that it was in the past. See Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 311.
299. Corpus Christi, 276 S.W.2d at 805 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
300. WADLEY, supra note 8, § 49.02(b). Unfortunately, this analogy was discarded by the
Texas Court of Appeals in Lone Star Gas Co. v. Murchison, 353 S.W.2d 870, 879-80 (Tex.
App. 1962). In that case, however, the court was addressing issues involving oil and gas, not
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analogy has been developed and applied in various contexts, and it may be
summarized quite simply:
Rights to possess wild animals-ferae naturae-only become
fixed upon "capture." Moreover, a wild animal, once it escaped
from the possessor back to its natural habitat, would become
unowned and subject to capture again. The one restraint on this
system of ownership which recognized a landowner's rights was
that it was trespass to enter another's property to capture a wild
animal.'o
Essentially, a property owner's rights in the groundwater beneath his land
are identical to his rights over a wild animal on his land. While the water is
beneath his land, he has the exclusive right to capture it, reduce it to
possession, and use it as he pleases. If he does not exercise this right, then
just as a wild animal may stray from one parcel to the next, so groundwater
may percolate from one parcel to the next, taking his chances of possession
with it. Nevertheless, the fact that the property owner may be divested of his
ownership interest because of his failure to protect it does not mean that the
interest did not exist to begin with. Also, the fact that the remedies available
to a dispossessed property owner are limited does not negate the reality of
his preexisting rights. In the same way that the law of trespass gives
structure and order to the pursuit of wild animals, the concept of ownership
in place sets the proper framework and context for the extraction and
possession of groundwater.
2. The Proper Meaning of the Rule of Capture
The analogy between groundwater and wild animals also provides
insight into the proper understanding of the rule of capture. In order for a
property owner to claim the right to capture a wild animal, he must have
access to that wild animal by a preexisting proprietary right. In other words,
he can only capture the wild animal because it is on his land. For anyone
else to capture the animal would constitute a trespass. 302 Thus, the right to
capture the wild animal or groundwater logically presupposes a more basic
and fundamental proprietary right. If there were no ownership interest,
however limited, existing prior to the time of capture, then the property
groundwater. Id. Thus, the reasons cited by the court for its refusal to apply this analogy to
oil and gas law are not applicable to the present discussion.
301. WADLEY, supra note 8, § 49.02(b).
302. Id.
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owner would have no more right to secure possession of the wild animal or
groundwater than anyone else. In other words, the rule of capture is a
derivative or secondary doctrine that is dependent on an underlying
framework of property ownership.
This approach to the rule of capture is reinforced by the context in which
it was originally developed. After all, the strict English form of the rule of
capture was originally known as "the absolute ownership doctrine."303 As
explained by the court in Acton v. Blundell, a property owner owns "all that
lies beneath his surface."3 " This fundamental ownership interest-
ownership in place-provides the logical foundation for the derivative right
to "dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes at his
free will and pleasure"-rule of capture.30 s The rule of capture was never
intended to be an independent theory of ownership; it has always been
contingent on a more basic theory.
As the Day court acknowledges, there are significant limits and
exceptions to the rule of capture.306 Even though damages from subsidence,
percolation, and drainage are difficult to prove, a property owner may still
maintain a cause of action in cases of "malice or wanton conduct."307
Moreover, the Day court suggests that these are "only examples" of the
possible causes of action that might be maintained in a dispute over
groundwater.308 The original English rule of "non-liability" was only a
"general doctrine."o' It was intended to protect a property owner in the
securement and enjoyment of his own groundwater rights against frivolous,
speculative, and unverifiable claims. It was not intended to provide a
rationale by which a property owner could surreptitiously claim rights over
the groundwater of others.31 o Hence, the rule of capture must not be viewed
as the absolute standard by which all property interests are defined, but
rather as a limiting doctrine by which preexisting property interests are
identified and secured.
303. Id. at § 50.11(e).
304. Acton v. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1235.
305. Id. at 1235.
306. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814,825-26 (Tex. 2012).
307. Id. at 825-26.
308. Id. at 826.
309. Id.
310. See Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1235.
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B. The Ramifications of Clarifying Theoretical Inconsistencies
To explore the ramifications that should follow the harmonization of the
concept of ownership in place and the rule of capture, it is important to
articulate clearly the standard being suggested. The foregoing sections may
be summarized as follows: Groundwater is owned in place. This means that
a property owner has a vested right to extract, possess, and use the water
from beneath his land as he sees fit. At the same time, property owners
must balance their competing interests by using the rule of capture as a
limiting doctrine that helps to define the extent to which actions can be
sustained for the wasteful, wanton, and malicious conduct of other
groundwater users. Thus, the rule of capture is built on and must be subject
to the more fundamental concept of ownership in place. This understanding
of groundwater rights harmonizes the diverse principles proposed and
affirmed in the Day decision. And it entails important practical
ramifications.
1. The Ramifications of Theoretical Consistency for Private
Landowners
The harmonization of the concept of ownership in place and the rule of
capture will have significant effects on private landowners. There are two
specific ramifications that should be noted. First, when ownership in place
is asserted and the rule of capture is confined to its proper function,
disputes over groundwater will take on an entirely different character. As
long as the rule of capture is viewed as providing absolute immunity to the
party extracting water, there is an inherent incentive for property owners to
pump aggressively, without considering the future effects of their actions.
But if the rule of capture is interpreted as complementary to ownership in
place, and if the causes of action for waste, malice, and wanton conduct are
vigorously applied, then property owners will be encouraged to pump
responsibly, with a view toward the maximization of limited resources.
For example, such an approach would have dramatically changed the
outcome of City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton.1' Dissenting from
the majority, Justice Griffin argued that it was quintessentially wasteful to
pump 10 million gallons of groundwater into a river each day, lose 7.5
million gallons in transportation, and finally use only 2.5 million gallons for
beneficial purposes.312 Likewise, Justice Wilson argued that it was utterly
311. See City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1955).
312. Id. at 804 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
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useless for the court to instruct the neighboring property owners to "offset
defendants' wells and produce an enormous amount of water for which
they have no use."' Unfortunately, the majority adopted an absolute
interpretation of the rule of capture that merely paid lip-service to actions
for waste, malice, and wanton conduct.3 14 If the majority had begun with the
assumption of ownership in place and balanced the rule of capture with a
more realistic understanding of waste, malice, and wanton conduct, then
the City of Pleasanton would not have been forced to consider a well-
pumping war with the City of Corpus Christi. Instead, Corpus Christi
would have been forced to find a more responsible method of extraction
and transportation-a method that did not result in the daily loss of 7.5
million gallons of groundwater.
Second, if property owners are going to enjoy the vitality and strength
that the concept of ownership in place provides to their ownership interests,
they must also prepare to bear the burdens that accompany such interests.
The most notable burden that may fall on property owners is a property tax
on their groundwater interests. As noted previously, when the Texas
Supreme Court first recognized ownership of oil and gas in place in Texas
Co. v. Daugherty, it was for the purpose of determining whether oil and gas
rights constituted a taxable vested property interest.315 After a lengthy
analysis, the court concluded that "the value of [a party's underground
property rights i]s assessable against it for taxation." 316 Since the Day court
commenced its analysis of ownership in place with an examination of
Daugherty, and since the court explicitly stated that it found "no reason to
treat groundwater differently" from oil and gas as regards this principle, it is
likely that the Day decision will be used to justify the assessment of taxes
against groundwater interests." Unfortunately, this possibility will likely
grow stronger with the development of an independent market of private
contractual groundwater transfers.
2. The Ramifications of Theoretical Consistency for Regulatory
Agencies
The harmonization of the concept of ownership in place and the rule of
capture should also have significant effects on the regulation of
313. Id. at 808 (Wilson, J., dissenting).
314. Id. at 801-03.
315. Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717, 722 (Tex. 1915). See supra Part II.B.1.c.(1).
316. Daugherty, 176 S.W. at 722.
317. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 823, 829, 831-32 (Tex. 2012).
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groundwater. Most importantly, with respect to the specific circumstances
addressed by Day, the historical use requirement of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority Act must be revoked. Such an arbitrary requirement is
antithetical to both the concept of ownership in place and the rule of
capture because it makes groundwater rights contingent on the use of one's
property rather than inherent in the ownership and possession of one's
property. In reality, rather than facilitating development and conservation,
such a requirement attempts to artificially freeze water usage at an arbitrary
level. This is contrary to the stated purpose of the Edwards Aquifer
Authority.31 9 The historical use requirement does not protect or equitably
distribute groundwater rights; it undermines them.
If the historical use requirement was eliminated and only the beneficial
use requirement was enforced, then property owners would be forced to
develop their groundwater rights more efficiently. The increased
competition for limited resources would cultivate the development of new
methods of extraction, use, and recycling. It would also provide incentive
for private contractual transfers. Rather than binding current property
owners to the ways in which prior owners managed their groundwater in
bygone days, regulations based solely on beneficial use would allow natural
scarcities to fuel innovation and new development.
Instead of regulating on the basis of historical use, regulatory agencies
ought to emphasize beneficial use requirements. Such requirements are
more consistent with the concept of ownership in place and the rule of
capture because they allow for flexibility and are tied to the well-established
exceptions to the rule of capture. For example, if a localized water
conservation district, such as the Edwards Aquifer Authority, is confronted
with groundwater scarcity in a severe drought, then it may be justified in
prohibiting the extraction of groundwater for extraneous, non-essential
uses since such extraction could be considered waste, malice, or wanton
conduct. Moreover, since this type of regulation is consistent with the
common law causes of action, private individuals could enforce it through
legal action. This would be a significant boon to the practical administration
of such a regulatory scheme.
At the same time, regardless of what regulatory scheme prevails, the Day
decision provides a new bulwark for private property rights. The Day court
unequivocally acknowledges that its affirmation of the ownership of
groundwater in place will cause certain regulatory actions to be regarded as
318. See supra Part II.A.2.d.
319. EAAA §§ 1.01, 1.06, 1.07. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
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constitutional takings.3 20 Not surprisingly, the Edwards Aquifer Authority
feared this result: "Moreover the Authority is concerned that takings
litigation will disrupt the robust market that has developed in its permits
and that buyers will be wary of paying for permits that may later be
reduced."321  Notwithstanding the Authority's fears, the Day court
concludes:
The Takings Clause ensures that the problems of a limited public
resource-the water supply-are shared by the public, not
foisted onto a few. We cannot know, of course, the extent to
which the Authority's fears will yet materialize, but the burden of
the Takings Clause on government is no reason to excuse its
applicability.3 22
The court is correct to disregard the fears of the Authority. After all, it is
inconsistent for the government to claim to regulate groundwater for the
good of its citizens as a whole while simultaneously stripping them of their
groundwater rights as individuals. Thus, in the end, Day's affirmation of
ownership in place provides a much-needed reaffirmation of constitutional
property rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The theory of groundwater rights is important. In the area encompassed
by the Edwards Aquifer alone, animals and crops, protected species and
rare plants, special ecosystems and general waterways, small towns and
large cities, all depend upon groundwater for survival. An erosion of
groundwater rights today will lead to a drought of agricultural, industrial,
and municipal development in the future. If, however, courts and
lawmakers are willing to embrace the task commenced by the Day court
and synthesize ownership in place and the rule of capture into a consistent
theory of groundwater rights, then the future is bright. And perhaps the
quarrels of the Patriarchs will finally become a thing of the past as men
learn to understand and utilize their God-given resources in a more
consistent and faithful manner.
320. Day, 369 S.W.3d at 843-44.
321. Id. at 843.
322. Id. at 843-44.
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